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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN MISSOURI*
JOHN S. DIVILBISS"*
I. DiscovR
The 1960 Rules of Civil Procedure materially enlarged the scope of
discovery permitted, but controversies concerning this subject continue to
find their way into the appellate courts. Two significant cases appeared
within the past year.
State ex rel. Rhodes v. Craiut' was possibly the most important dis-
covery case in recent years. Plaintiff sued a corporate defendant for the
wrongful death of her husband. Defendant submitted an interrogatory to
plaintiff asking: "Do you or your attorney know the names of any wit-
nesses to this accident? If so, what are the names and addresses of the
witnesses?"
Plaintiff answered that she knew of no witnesses and did not know
whether her attorney had located any. This answer was not satisfactory to
defendant so it asked the court to order plaintiff to give a complete
answer which would include names of witnesses known to plaintiff's at-
torney. The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that
the names of witnesses to an automobile accident which are dis-
covered by an attorney during the attorney's investigation of the
cause for the client and known solely to the attorney, are not sub-
ject to discovery by an interrogatory directed to the attorney's
client because the identity and names of such witnesses are privi-
leged matter and constitute "work product."2
A mandamus petition put the case before the Missouri Supreme Court
and by a vote of five to two the court held that witnesses located by
plaintiff's attorney during his investigation must be disclosed to defendant.
The two dissenting judges were of the opinion that the names were "work
product" and thus protected from discovery.
No lawyer enjoys the surprise of meeting a witness for the first time
*This article contains a discussion of selected cases appearing in Volumes 359
through 375 of South Western Reporter, Second Series.
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 373 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
2. Id. at 39.
(18)
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on the stand, and the broadened discovery now permitted should eliminate
this occupational hazard.
A second important decision is State ex rel. Hudson v. Ginn.3 Plaintiff
sued defendant for injuries allegedly suffered in an automobile accident. De-
fendant submitted several interrogatories to plaintiff but two are of special
interest. Interrogatory 20 asked:
If you have ever had any other claim or suit for injuries, dam-
ages, or disability other than the present petition, state all such
previous claims or suits, the nature of your injuries or disabilities
in the same, the dates of such previous suits or claims, the names
and addresses of the persons, firms or corporations against which
such claims or suits were made, the name and address of the court,
commission or other body in which or before which such suits were
filed and the amounts paid in settlement or judgment for such
claims or Suits. 4
The supreme court held that the trial judge lacked discretion to deny
the discovery sought by interrogatory 20.
Rule 57.01(b) provides that a party
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or to the claim or defense of any other party.... It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at trial if
the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
Few things are more likely to lead to the -discovery of admissible evi-
dence than information concerning prior claims of the plaintiff. How else
is the defendant to know if he is paying for injuries already recompensed?
Interrogatory 21 asked:
If you have made claim under any health, accident, hospital,
disability or other type of insurance for any sort of benefits, pay-
ments or allowances by reason of any injuries sustained by you in
the accident (referred to in your petition) or any expenses incurred
by you or paid by you, state the following:
a. Name and address of each such company.
b. Policy number of each such company.
3. 374 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
4. Id. at 36.
19651
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c. Nature of claim made.
d. Disposition of said claim.
e. Claim number assigned said claim. 5
The trial judge refused to order plaintiff to answer this interrogatory
and the supreme court held that this action was within the trial court's
sound discretion. The logic of this conclusion is not completely clear. The
court said that it would not overrule the trial judge because it was unable
to say "as a -matter of law" that the requested information was reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Emphasis
added.) This result is difficult to understand because the court acknow-
ledged: (1) that defendant hoped to discover some inconsistency in the
claims made by plaintiff against his own insurer and those made against
defendant, and (2) "the information sought in No. 21 migkt become ma-
teria, relevant and free of any reasonable claim of privilege, if any he has,
upon development of a situation such as this forecast by relator."
(Emphasis added.) 6
Defendant seems to be in an unenviable position. He does not know
what plaintiff's answer would be and he is denied discovery because he
cannot demonstrate that the unknown answers are, as a matter of law,
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Plaintiff did not claim that answering the inquiry would be an unrea-
sonable burden, for sufficient safeguards already exist to prevent this type
of abuse.7 It is hard to understand why the trial judge should have discretion
to deny discovery of materials which, in the court's own words, "might be-
come material."
Missouri Rule 57.01(b) is substantially the same as Federal Rule 26(b)
which has been in effect since 1939. The supreme court was undoubtedly
aware of the construction given the federal rule and it would seem logical
that they intended a similar construction for the Missouri rule. State ex rel.
Hudson v. Ginn is, however, quite out of harmony with the federal deci-
sions. These expressions by the federal courts indicate the very broad dis-
covery permitted under Federal Rule 26(b):
A party should not be foreclosed from examining on any sub-
ject which might conceivably have a bearing on the subject mat-
ter of the action;8
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 38.
7. Mo. R. Crv. P. 56.01(a), 57.01(c).
8. Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., 4 F.R.D. 167, 169 (D. Del. 1944).
[Vol. 30
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[Ulnless the information sought can have no possible bear-
ing on the issues disclosed by the pleadings, the interrogatories
should be answered; 9
"Fishing expeditions" for evidentiary facts are permitted under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So long as interrogatories re-
late to the subject matter of an action, and may lead to relevant
facts, they are proper.3°
A leading text writer referring to Federal Rule 26(b) states:
Indeed it is not too strong to say that discovery should be con-
sidered relevant where there is any possibility that the information
sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action. If
protection is needed, it can be better provided by the discretionary
powers of the Court under Rule 30, rather than a constricting con-
cept of relevance."
The need for permitting this broad discovery is demonstrated by de-
fendant's dilemma in the instant case. If plaintiff did in fact make claims
against his own insurer totally inconsistent with those made against de-
fendant, defendant will never be allowed to know it and the damaging
effect of such inconsistency will never reach the jury. This result seems out
of harmony with Missouri's discovery rules.
II. OPENING STATEMENTS
The recent case of Butcher v. Main' 2 is a sharp reminder to trial
lawyers that opening statements can lose law suits. Plaintiff sued three
defendants but two of those defendants were granted directed verdicts at
the close of plaintiff's opening statement. The two defendants receiving
directed verdicts had collided on the highway ahead of plaintiff. Plaintiff
was able to stop short of the wreck and while so stopped was struck from
the rear by a third defendant, Hiram Main. Plaintiff's counsel in his open-
ing statement said that plaintiff "had ample time to apply her brakes and
come to a slow and gradual stop" behind the collision, and the plaintiff
"remained in that position for a period of about five to ten seconds" before
being hit from the rear by defendant Main. This demonstrated rather
clearly that the negligence of the two dismissed defendants was not a
proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.
9. Foundry Equipment Co. v. Carl-Mayer Corp., 14 FED. RULEs SERV. 33.31,
Case 3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 1950).
10. Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
11. 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 647 at 67
(Wright ed. 1961).
12. 371 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1963).
19651
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Since plaintiff pleaded similar allegations, a demurrer might properly
have been sustained. In any event, "The quoted allegation in plaintiff's
petition and the similar recital of her counsel in the opening statement,
disclose[d] a situation which would clearly bar her recovery."13
The supreme court cautions that trial courts "should be very reluctant
to direct a verdict at the close of plaintiff's opening statement." 1" The mere
failure of a plaintiff to state facts in his opening statement sufficient to make
a submissible case is not grounds for a directed verdict unless counsel
affirmatively admits that he has no evidence on the missing elements.15 More
commonly the difficulty comes from an opening statement which admits a
fact, the existence of which bars recovery.16
One further hazard must be watched. Remarks made in an opening
statement may be judicial admissions and as such they relieve one's oppo-
nent from the burden of proving the matter admitted. The thin line
between a judicial admission and a mere statement of anticipated proof is
not always clear.1 7 A fairly recent case demonstrates this problem. In Bayer
v. American Mitt. Cas. Co.1s plaintiffs sued defendant for fraud contending
that they had been induced to invest money in the defendant company at
a time when the company was insolvent. There was no direct evidence
that the company was insolvent when plaintiffs made their investment and
plaintiffs sought to fill this gap with an alleged judicial admission made by
defense counsel in his opening statement. Defense counsel had said the evi-
dence would show that when plaintiffs were negotiating with defendant,
plaintiffs agreed to put their money into defendant company to "build up
its assets, so to say, to make the company solvent, to give it operating
capital."
13. Id. at 207.
14. Id. at 206.
15. Butcher v. Main, 371 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1963). In Republic Steel
Corp. v. Atlas Housewrecking & Lumber Corp., 113 S.W.2d 155 (K.C. Mo. App.
1938), the court directed a verdict for plaintiff because defendant admitted that
he had only one defense and the court found that defense legally insufficient.
16. In Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291, 299, 49 S.W. 1028, 1030 (1899) the
court said:
Courts are warranted in acting upon the admissions of counsel in the
trial of a cause. They are officers of the court, and represent their clients,
and their admissions thus made bind their principals.
It has been ruled again and again that where counsel in their opening
statements state or admit facts the existence of which precludes a recovery
by their clients, the courts may close the case at once and give judgment
against the clients.
17. Russ v. Wabash Western Ry., 112 Mo. 45, 20 S.W. 472 (1892); Wonderly
v. Little Hoys Inv. Co., 184 S.W. 1188 (St. L. Mo. App. 1916); Fillingham v.
St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 573, 77 S.W. 314, 316 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
18. 359 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1962).
[Vol. 30
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The supreme court held that these words did not constitute a binding
admission that the defendant company was insolvent at the time of the
negotiations but rather were mere statements of anticipated proof. Defense
counsel had prefaced his remarks by saying, "I can tell you what I think
the evidence in this case will disclose," and this seems to have diluted the
effect of what followed.
While directed verdicts at the close of opening statements are rather
rare, it is worthwhile to remember that admissions made during an opening
statement can change the outcome of a case.
III. POsT-TRIAL MOTIONS
Allegations of error are not preserved for appellate review unless pre-
sented to the trial judge in a motion for a new trial. A good deal of error
has thus been waived because it was not mentioned in the new trial motion
or because it was not described in sufficient detail.
Rule 79.03 provides in part: "Allegations of error in order to be pre-
served for appellate review, must be presented to the trial court in a motion
for a new trial." Where definite objections or requests were made during
the trial in accordance with Rule 79.01, including specific objections to in-
structions, a general statement in the motion of any allegations of error
based thereon is sufficient.
As specific objections to evidence must be made during trial, a gen-
eral objection as to the admission of evidence would seem to be a literal
compliance with the rule.
In State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Salmark Hore
Builders, Inc."9 appellant made such a general objection in his new trial
motion when he complained only that the trial court "erred in admitting
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial evidence on behalf of plaintiff."
The supreme court somewhat reluctantly agreed that this was sufficient
to preserve a specific point of evidence for review. Had not the court felt
bound to follow earlier cases the result would probably have been different.
The court severely criticized the use of such general objections for they
do nothing to aid the trial judge in correcting his own mistakes and thus
frustrate the purpose of the new trial motion. The court said:
Surely a general catch-all objection that the trial court erred in
admitting incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial testimony should
not be sufficient to preserve all matters for appellant review where-
19. 375 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964).
19651
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in the trial court (perhaps in ten to a hundred different instances)
admitted evidence over the objection of a party. In view of the
prior ruling to the contrary... we, nevertheless, shall rule the ques-
tion presented on its merits.20
Cautious lawyers may find this sufficient encouragement for including
detailed specifications of error in future new trial motions.21 In any event,
the case demonstrates that Rule 79.01 could stand some revising. Appellate
briefs must specify in detail the particular evidence ruling complained of.
If the trial judge is to correct his own errors and eliminate unnecessary
appeals, he should have the same information.
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH AcTIONS
Accidents which cause personal injuries followed by death from a dis-
puted cause pose special problems for Missouri lawyers. If the injuries pro-
duced the death, damages for the wrongful death may be recovered by the
widow, minor children or others specified in the statute. 22 If death came
from another cause, such as a pre-existing cancer, the decedent's claim for
personal injuries survives and may be asserted by his executor or adminis-
trator "and the measure of damages [is] the same as if such death ... had
not occurred.1 23 In short, if the defendant caused the death he is liable
under the wrongful death statute; if he caused only injuries -not resulting
in death, he is liable to decedent's personal representative for those injuries.
When there is a dispute as to the cause of death, the specter of double
liability looms. For example, the widow may claim defendant caused her
husband's death and sue under the wrongful death statute. Decedent's
administrator may claim that defendant did not cause the death and sue
20. 375 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Mo. 1964).
21. In Bader v. Hylarides, 374 S.W.2d 616 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964), appellant
complained that the trial judge had erred in allowing an improper closing argu-
ment and in admitting hearsay evidence. Appellant's new trial motion said simply:
"The court erred in admitting irrelevant, incompetent, illegal, hearsay, immaterial,
prejudicial and highly inflammatory evidence and testimony." The Court of Appeals
said of this motion: "We doubt that this specification meets the requirement of
Rule 83.13(a) supra, that 'no allegations of error shall be considered ... except
such as have been presented to or expressly decided by the trial court.' Both of
these assignments are overruled."
22. § 537.080, RSMo 1959. This section provides in part: "Whenever the
death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another.
." (Emphasis added.)
23. § 537.020, RSMo 1959. This section provides in part: "Causes of action
for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, . . . shall not abate by
reason of his death ... but ... shall survive to the personal representative of such
injured party." (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 30
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to recover for decedent's personal injuries. It is obviously unfair to require
defendant to pay in one action because he caused the death and then pay
in a separate action on the basis that he did not cause the death. Unfair or
not, the result has occurred.
In Harris v. Goggins24 decedent had cancer. While decedent was being
moved from the hospital to her home, the ambulance in which she was riding
collided with a truck. Decedent sustained injuries and died three months
later. Decedent's husband brought suit under the wrongful death statute
alleging that the collision caused the death. He later dismissed his action
with prejudice and released the defendants on payment of $5,125.00. There-
after decedent's son, as administrator, brought an action to recover for
decedent's injuries on the theory that the collision had not caused the death.
Defendants protested that the husband's action was a bar to the adminis-
trator's suit "by reason of appropriation, estoppel, merger and res judicata,"
and that the legislature did not intend to give more than one recovery.
The supreme court rejected defendants' arguments and allowed the admin-
istrator to recover saying:
We agree that the legislature intended only one recovery. The
difficulty, however, is that it did not prescribe any procedure where-
by it could determine which should be the one to recover.... If
[defendant] wishes to make a settlement he should obtain a re-
lease from both. If he cannot obtain the releases or if he does not
want to settle the case, he can resort to the procedure followed in
Plaza Express. 2 5
The procedure used and approved in Plaza Express28 was an interpleader
action. The court ordered the widow and administrator to interplead and
have adjudicated whether the injury caused decedent's death and restrained
both from continuing their separate actions pending this determination.
After this issue was decided by the court as an equity matter, the party
owning the claim could then "proceed therewith as an action at law in the
court in which the claim is pending and the other claimant must be en-
joined from proceeding further with his or her claim." 27
The interpleader action not only cuts off one claimant but also makes
a determination on the cause of death which is binding in the subsequent
24. 374 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1964).
25. Id. at 14.
26. Plaza Express Company, Inc. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17
(En Banc 1955).
27. Id. at 177, 280 S.W.2d at 25.
19651
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suit. This apparently was an unexpected result for defendant in Donohue
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.28 The decedent in this case also suffered from
cancer and the cause of his death was in dispute. The Public Service Com-
pany was faced with a suit for personal injuries by the widow in her capacity
as executrix and a separate suit by the widow for wrongful death. Public
Service Company filed an interpleader action joining the widow personally
and in her capacity as executrix and asked the court to determine which
of the two actions the widow would be permitted to prosecute. The court
in equity ruled with the consent of all the parties, that the widow was
barred from prosecuting her action as executrix. Later when the wrongful
death case came to trial, Public Service Company denied a causal connec-
tion between the injuries suffered by decedent and his subsequent death.
The court gave an instruction directing a verdict for defendant if decedent's
death was caused by cancer.
The supreme court held that this was reversible error saying:
A decree by court of equity barring the personal injury case from
further prosecution must of necessity be based upon a finding that
the injury caused the death of the injured party. If that be true,
then the issue of fact has been determined and the decree is bind-
ing on both the plaintiff and the defendant .... Therefore, in the
trial of the case for wrongful death the issue of whether the injury
caused death should not be submitted to a jury.2 9
The court also said: "The fact that the decree in the equity action was
entered by the consent of the parties makes it no less binding on all of the
parties in this case." 0
28. 374 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1963).
29. Id. at 81.
30. The binding effect of judgments entered by consent of the parties will be
discussed in detail in a later issue of the Misouri Law Review.
[Vol. 30
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